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Enhancing informatics competency under uncertainty at the point of
decision: a knowing about knowing vision
Abstract
Most informatics activity is aimed at reducing unnecessary errors, mistakes and misjudgements at the point of
decision, insofar as these arise from inappropriate accessing and processing of data and information.
Healthcare professionals use the results of scientific research, when available, and 'big data', when rigorously
analysed, as inputs into the probability judgements that need to be made in decision making under
uncertainty. But these judgements are needed irrespective of the state of 'the evidence' and personalised
evidence on person/patient-important criteria is very often poor or lacking. This final stage in 'translation to
the bedside' has received relatively little attention in the medical, nursing, or health informatics literature, until
the recent appearance of 'cognitive informatics'. Positive experience and feed-back from several thousand
students who have experienced exercises in assigning probabilities informs our future vision in which better
decisions result from healthcare professionals - indeed all of us - having accepted that probability assignment
is a skill, with the internal coherence and external correspondence of the probabilities assigned as twin
evaluative criteria. As a route to improved correspondence - in the absence of the systematic recording and
monitoring of real world judgments that would be the normal pathway to quality improvement - a 'Prober' is a
set of statements to which the respondent supplies their personal probabilities that a statement is true. They
receive the proper Brier score and its decomposition as analytical feedback, along with graphic
representations of their discrimination and calibration, the two key components of good correspondence.
Provided with estimates of their sensitivity (mean probability true for true statements) and specificity (1
minus mean probability true for false statements) they can visualise themselves as a 'test' when making
diagnostic and prognostic judgements , thereby being given the cognitive foundation for such reflection in
their clinical practice, including 'reflection in action'. They acknowledge that an appropriate balance of
intuition and analysis is required, as in Hammond's Cognitive Continuum, and are made aware of the
cognitive and motivated biases that can prevent us knowing 'how much we know about how much we know',
with its deleterious effect on decision quality. Probability exercises, such as 'Probers', are proposed as an
enhancement of professional courses and virtual learning environments, such as the TIGER initiative in
nursing, through which the competency portfolio of all those seeking to deliver high quality person/patient-
centred care can be expanded.
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Abstract. Most informatics activity is aimed at reducing unnecessary 
errors, mistakes and misjudgements at the point of decision, insofar as these arise 
from inappropriate accessing and processing of data and information. Healthcare 
professionals use the results of scientific research, when available, and ‘big data’, 
when rigorously analysed, as inputs into the probability judgements that need to be 
made in decision making under uncertainty. But these judgements are needed 
irrespective of the state of 'the evidence' and personalised evidence on 
person/patient-important criteria is very often poor or lacking. This final stage in 
‘translation to the bedside’ has received relatively little attention in the medical, 
nursing, or health informatics literature, until the recent appearance of ‘cognitive 
informatics’. Positive experience and feed-back from several thousand students 
who have experienced exercises in assigning probabilities informs our future 
vision in which better decisions result from healthcare professionals – indeed all of 
us – having accepted that probability assignment is a skill, with the 
internal coherence and external correspondence of the probabilities assigned as 
twin evaluative criteria. As a route to improved correspondence – in the absence of 
the systematic recording and monitoring of real world judgments that would be the 
normal pathway to quality improvement - a ‘Prober’ is a set of statements to which 
the respondent supplies their personal probabilities that a statement is true. They 
receive the proper Brier score and its decomposition as analytical feedback, along 
with graphic representations of their discrimination and calibration, the two key 
components of good correspondence. Provided with estimates of their sensitivity 
(mean probability true for true statements) and specificity (1 minus mean 
probability true for false statements) they can visualise  themselves as a ‘test’ 
when making diagnostic and prognostic judgements , thereby being given the 
cognitive foundation for such reflection in their clinical practice, including 
'reflection in action'. They acknowledge that an appropriate balance of intuition 
and analysis is required, as in Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum, and are made 
aware of the cognitive and motivated biases that can prevent us knowing ‘how 
much we know about how much we know’, with its deleterious effect on decision 
quality. Probability exercises, such as ‘Probers’, are proposed as an enhancement 
of professional courses and virtual learning environments, such as the TIGER 
initiative in nursing, through which the competency portfolio of all those seeking 
to deliver high quality person/patient-centred care can be expanded.  
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Introduction  
Our vision is of the better decisions that will characterise the coming era of 
person/patient-centred care as a result of healthcare professionals – indeed all of us - 
accepting that, in decision making, we are necessarily Bayesians.[1] We accept that the 
assessments of the future chances which permeate decisions are ontologically personal 
and subjective, whatever the extent to which they are epistemologically-based on 
robust frequencies and however widely they are inter-subjectively agreed. All parties 
have rejected the temptations of right-wrong thinking, reflected in testing by non-
probabilistic Multiple Choice Questions, along with the unwarranted confidence, trust 
and denial it often generates. Healthcare professionals treat the results of scientific 
research, when available, and ‘big data’, when rigorously analysed, as relevant inputs 
into the probability judgements that need to be made irrespective of the state of 'the 
evidence'. It is accepted that competence in making probability judgements is the key 
to improved handling of uncertainty at the point of decision so it is part of the training 
and education of clinicians. 
Most informatics activity is ultimately aimed at reducing unnecessary 
errors, mistakes and misjudgements at the point of decision, insofar as these arise from 
inappropriate accessing and processing of data and information. For some criteria and 
some conditions high-quality 'evidence- based' probabilities can be acquired directly or 
through a nomogram or 'risk calculator' (preferably a probability calculator). [2] But in 
many cases the clinician will need to use their personal belief probability judgements to 
remedy the absence of, or to better personalise, the available estimates. 
This frequently necessary final stage in 'bench to bedside translation' has received 
relatively little attention in the medical, nursing or health informatics literature. The 
widespread assumption has been that this is an intuitive competence that can, and can 
only, be acquired intuitively, through experience. However, this ignores a significant 
literature on how the quality of probability judgements can be assessed, on the 
empirical evidence on clinician performance in this respect,  [3,4] on the possible 
sources of limited performance, and on possible routes to improved quality. Since 
it will take time to overcome the institutional-professional barriers to systematic 
judgemental recording and monitoring in practice – the normal route to competence 
improvement - our vision is pessimistic in this respect. However, as part of the 
increasing interest in ‘cognitive informatics’, clinicians can be provided with the 
cognitive basis for reflecting continuously on their judgemental practice 
and performance, both 'in action' and outside it, [5,6] accepting that an appropriate 
balance of intuition and analysis is required, as in Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum, 
[7–9] as well as an awareness of the likely cognitive as well as motivated biases that 
may hinder them knowing ‘how much they know about how much they know’. [10] 
Probability exercises (such as ‘Probers’) are therefore an integral part of our vision, 
enhancing professional courses and virtual learning environments, such as The TIGER 
Initiative in nursing.[11]  
In relation to the evaluation of probability assessments - and assessor - Kenneth 
Hammond and others have emphasised that two distinct criteria are relevant, and drawn 
attention to the fact that, for a variety of reasons, including different meta-theoretic 
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paradigms, the two have attracted different sets of adherents. [12] There are those who 
wish to judge probabilities primarily by their internal coherence and those who wish to 
judge them primarily by their external correspondence. The vast majority of those who 
emphasise coherence are pessimistic about judgemental competence, because clinicians 
typically perform poorly on coherence tests, such as calculating the predictive value of 
a test result, given the sensitivity of the test and the prevalence of the target condition. 
Most optimists emphasise external correspondence, arguing that abstract tests of 
coherence are not 'ecologically valid', [13] since the items are not representative of 
those that actually arise. But there are also pessimists among those who favour the 
correspondence criterion, doubting whether experience will be productive in the 
absence of quick and unbiased feedback. [14,15] The 'clinical versus actuarial' 
controversy, associated primarily with the name of Paul Meehl, [16] rumbles on. 
1. Methods 
 
In the case of the coherence criterion, teaching of the way in which probabilities should 
be combined is required. Correspondence can only be taught through probabilistic 
exercises with relevant feedback. A Prober is a set of statements to which the 
respondent supplies their personal probability that a statement such as ‘The true 
positive rate indicates the sensitivity of a test’ is true. The set used currently consists of 
50 statements relating mainly to research methods. A variety of probability response 
sets are available for use in the software. A compromise between response granularity 
and item set size is necessary to achieve a reasonable number of observations for an 
individual at each probability. We currently use seven discrete probabilities: 0, 10, 30, 
50, 70, 90 and 100%. Respondents are advised that they should enter their honest 
probabilities and in order to avoid 'motivated biasing', they will receive full marks for 
completion of the exercise. In any case, the accompanying teaching makes clear that 
the assessments are scored by a proper scoring rule (Brier's) which ensures that 
respondent's expected score will always be maximised by reporting honest beliefs [17]. 
After completion the respondent can learn whether each statement was actually 
true or false, along with short elaborations, mainly in the case of false items. The main, 
analytical feedback comes in the form of the Brier score and its decomposition, [18] 
(Figure 1a) One key measure is that of discrimination, the difference between the 
average probabilities assigned to true and false items, plotted on the right and left axes 
respectively. (These represent the sensitivity and 1 minus the specificity of the judge 
interpreted as a ‘test’.) Graphically discrimination is represented by the slope of the 
line joining them. This can be compared with the 45 degree slope of the diagonal which 
indicates perfect discrimination. An associated diagram (Figure 1b) provides 
information relevant to the other key competence, calibration. Calibration is measured 
by the degree to which the ‘frequency correct’ matches ‘probability assigned’. For 
example, if a respondent assigned 70% to 10 statements, then perfect calibration exists 
if 7 of these are actually true. Deviations from 7 in either direction indicate poorer 
calibration. Accompanying teaching stresses that calibration should not be improved at 
the expense of using whatever discrimination ability is possessed 
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2. Results 
The latest in 35 years of Probers use has been in the Translational Health Masters  
course at the Sydney School of Public Health. In 2012 and 2013, 63 students 
responded. (Completion rates were high as the exercises were a compulsory 
assignment). Their Brier scores ranged from .1 to .55 (where 0 is perfect and 1 is worst 
possible.) The mean score of .25 (SD .08) is actually that which would be achieved by 
assigning .5 probability to all 50 statements, so that on average the population did no 
better than chance. The average sensitivity (mean probability true assigned to true 
statements) was 75% and average specificity (1 minus probability true assigned to false 
statements was 64%. Only one of the 63 had a specificity exceeding sensitivity and 
hence a discrimination line with a negative slope. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Student showing good discrimination (top) and calibration botton 
As in previous settings there was no indication of respondent difficulty in 
completing the task at a practical level. Feedback comments have been solely about the 
unfamiliar nature of the task, without questioning of its relevance, and mainly doubts 
about whether using numerical probabilities and regarding it as a skill would be 
acceptable 'where I work’ because it would be disruptive of organisational routines 
and/or professional hierarchies 
3. Discussion 
Having arrived at a numerical estimate of, say, 30%, the Prober-aware health 
professional will recall that if all their 30%s were monitored and collated the frequency 
correct should be 30%. They will be able to reflect ‘in action’ on their calibration. In 
relation to their whole set of judgements and outside any specific case, they can ask 
themselves whether they assigned a (much) higher average probability to the occasions 
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when the target outcome occurred, than the average assigned when it did not occur. 
They will be able to reflect, outside of action, on their sensitivity and specificity and 
overall discrimination competence. 
Where is the ‘evaluation’ of Probers? Real world evaluation requires the 
systematic recording and monitoring of judgements that seems almost impossible in 
larger clinical settings. In our vision the ‘anatomy of judgment’ is taught alongside the 
anatomy of the human body in clinical curricula. Probers are part of the new cognitive 
informatics. 
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